Reflections of a Rational Republican

Source: The Economist via Reuters

In my post earlier this week, I concluded returning to Israel’s pre-1967 borders would make the country difficult to defend against Arab aggression, even with its vastly superior military. Even with a patchwork of land swaps, it would still be a challenge for Israel to defend.

Leaving aside the situation’s military dimension, politically there is an inherent contraction between a peace in the world “that is” versus the world that “will be”.

The World That Is

A call to return to the negotiating table could not have come at a worse time for Israel. The political stability in Egypt and Syria that enabled a lasting thirty-year peace between Israel and its neighbors is no longer assured.

Egypt is likely to become more democratic, and arguably, more Islamic and anti-Israel. In nearly every case where an Arab population democratized, it has chosen Islamic radicalism.

After all, when given the chance to elect their own government in Gaza, the Palestinians voted for rejectionist Hamas. Lebanon’s democracy similarly produced a state dominated by Hizbullah.

Meanwhile, Assad’s crackdown in Syria continues apace with no end in sight. Israel’s security apparatus is now left guessing if and how the political situation will stabilize over the long-term.

Finally, Hamas has frequently been Iran’s terrorist proxy against Israel. Exchanging land for “peace” would likely provide more opportunities for Hamas to attack Israeli civilians and be unlikely to lead to any lasting peace.

The bottom line is that the timing of President Obama’s initiative could not have come at a worse time for the Israelis.

While the “world that is” does not favor a solution today for the Israelis, the “world that will be” likely will.

The World That Will Be

While the Palestinians will likely never defeat the Israeli military, Palestinian demographics ultimately will.

Or will it?

Until this week, I had accepted the argument that Israel’s population would ultimately be overwhelmed by what former Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, called a “demographic threat to Israel as a Jewish state from a faster growing Palestinian population.“

While the number of Palestinians will likely surpass the number of Israelis in some future year, the alarm with which some have been trumpeting this demographic shift may not reflect the reality.

Yakov Faitelson has argued convincingly that the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has overstated the Palestinian population on several occasions. He suggests that these overestimates are politically motivated by a desire to make the Palestinian population appear to be as large as possible.

Either way, Faitelson’s argument does not change the fact that the Palestinian population is growing faster than the Israeli one. However, it does suggest that Israel has more time before a full demographic reversal takes place.

If Israel has more time and the political situation in neighboring capitals is still in flux, does it really make sense to push for a solution now?

Source: Google Maps, Reflections of a Rational Republican

In yesterday’s post, I indicated my desire to reflect upon President Obama’s proposal rather than fall prey to my deeply visceral initial reaction. In this post, I decided to tackle what I know best first: the situation’s military dynamics.

From a military perspective, the idea that the Israelis should accept Israel’s pre-1967 boundaries as a starting point for negotiation is preposterous.

To make my argument, I will rely on my five years’ experience as a military officer. My primary responsibility was to serve as a member of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) in ten war games per year against American military brigades of between 5,000 and 8,000 soldiers each.

I participated in a total of approximately 100 simulated desert operations involving hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles and thousands of soldiers on either side.

Source: CIA World Factbook, Reflections of a Rational Republican

As a member of the OPFOR, the Army trained me to fight using Soviet armored doctrine and tactics, the same tactics that Egyptian and Syrian forces would likely employ against the Israelis.

As the charts at the top and on the right show, reverting to Israel’s pre-1967 boundaries leaves Israel perilously vulnerable to its Arab neighbors. At its narrowest point, the distance between the West Bank’s western borders and the Mediterranean Sea is roughly between 10-20 kilometers.

The OPFOR, which was organized as a standard Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR), could traverse 30-50 kilometers in 4-5 hours in open desert terrain and against a well-trained American Brigade. In other words, a single Syrian MRR staging in the Palestinian West Bank has the potential to cut Israel in half within a single day.

Granted, Israel’s forces are much better trained and equipped than the Syrians’ are. Furthermore, the fighting would proceed more slowly in this region because Israel is 92% urbanized compared to the open terrain of the Mojave Desert.

That said, Israel’s urbanized environment is another key concern. As Tel Aviv-Yafo lies within 10-20 kilometers of the West Bank’s western border, over 3.2 million Israelis (43% of Israel’s population) would be within conventional artillery range the instant the conflict started.

In other words, expect hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties.

Then there is the question of numbers.

The countries surrounding Israel (including the Palestinian territories) have a combined population of nearly 122 million to Israel’s nearly 7.5 million. In essence, the Arab population in Israel’s adjacent states outnumbers Israel’s population by over 16 to 1.

Would the United States ever give up a territorial buffer that would provide an enemy  outnumbering it 16-to-1 with the capability to cut the United States in half in one day and expose a city that represented 43% of its population to massive artillery bombardment?

I think not.

To ask the Israelis to do the same is completely unrealistic.